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Creating and Reinforcing Discrimination: The Controversial 
Role of Accounting in Bank Lending  
Abstract 
This paper examines the controversial role played by accounting within the 
discriminatory bank-lending practices of a privately owned bank in Sri Lanka. It 
reports on an analytical auto-ethnography (during the period 1994-2004) 
coupled with follow-up interviews and reiterated analyses. Data were analysed 
using Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of field, capital, habitus and symbolic violence. 
The empirical findings of the paper illustrate how key capitals at macro levels 
(social, cultural and symbolic) are mobilised in the dominance structures within 
the banking lending field and how individuals with given habitus behave and 
follow given strategies to deploy rational accounting systems at a micro level to 
translate discriminatory bank lending policies into practice and, as a result, 
create and reinforce discrimination. 
 
Keywords: Accounting and discrimination; Bank lending; Bourdieu; Capital, 
Habitus; Symbolic violence; Domination, Sri Lanka  
1. Introduction 
This paper stems from a concern over accounting and discriminatory bank 
lending. There has been some interest amongst accounting researchers in 
exploring the controversial role of accounting in discriminatory practices. Thus, 
Boltanski and Chiapello (2005), Puxty (1986), and Tinker et al. (1991) explained 
the role of accounting in “discrimination” and clarified how class struggles have 
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been practiced within the discourse of corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
Further, Neu (2000), Davie (2002), and Fleischman and Tyson (2004) provide 
observations on how accounting techniques used on the British West Indies 
(BWI) plantations provided examples of employment of racist policies in 
controlling labour, productivity and costs. What has been relatively ignored in 
this emerging research is how the accounting techniques help to translate 
“discriminatory banking lending policies” into practice. This paper contributes to 
filling this perceived gap.  
 
Previous studies have highlighted that a nexus exists between accounting and 
discrimination. For instance, Fleischman and Tyson (2000) analysed the interface 
of race and accounting and concluded that race, rather than efficiency, served as 
the primary measuring calculus of plantation work. In a later study Fleischman 
and Tyson (2004) illustrated how accounting served slavery and its institutions 
through measurement, valuation and classification techniques that completely 
ignored the qualitative and human dimensions of slavery. Neu (2000) explained 
how accounting techniques helped to translate policies of conquest, annihilation, 
containment and assimilation into practice, with the resultant outcomes of 
reproductive genocide, cultural genocide and ecocide. Moreover, Davie (2002) 
highlighted accounting’s involvement in race relations and revealed how the 
invention of new afforestation accounting practices helped to create and 
perpetuate differentiated, racialised identities of social and economic relations. 
The issue of discriminatory accounting becomes even more important when 
accounting became engaged in, and facilitated, discriminatory mobilisation of 
financial capital, particularly in the context of bank lending in emerging 
economies. Thus, this paper investigates the accounting–discrimination nexus in 
the context of the bank-lending practices of a privately owned bank in Sri Lanka. 
Thus, it explores the research issue: how accounting helps to translate 
discriminatory bank lending policies into practice and reinforce discrimination. 
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The theoretical perspective of this paper draws on the work of Pierre Bourdieu 
(1996). It uses the tools of Bourdieu and his distinction between the dominant 
and the dominated (symbolic violence) and how that influences habitus (and 
therefore practice) to understand the accounting and discrimination issues in bank 
lending that the current accounting literature does not address. It uses multiple 
sources of evidence, including an auto-ethnography of a close-held bank in Sri 
Lanka, built around participant observations and the life experiences of one of the 
authors (during the period 1994-2004); semi-structured interviews with the 
participants in those historical events; documents and archival records; open-
ended questionnaires, internet conversations and exchanges of e-mails. The paper 
applies Bourdieu’s (2007) “sketch for self-analysis” framework and his concepts 
such as symbolic violence, habitus and domination to analyse the auto-
ethnographic data.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a 
literature review of accounting and discrimination, and combines it with the 
context of the bank lending developed from finance and banking literature. The 
theoretical framework is discussed in Section 3, while Section 4 provides a 
description of the research methods. In Section 5, the banking lending context of 
Sri Lanka is briefly presented. Section 6 presents the macro issue of mapping the 
field (as Bourdieu’s methodology does) – what constitutes the dominant and 
what/who is the dominated in this field (what key capitals are mobilised in that 
dominance) – and how does this field relate to the key fields of power.  Section 6 
then progresses onto exploring the micro practices – how individuals with a given 
habitus behave and follow given strategies which have the effect of creating and 
reinforcing discrimination. Finally, Section 7 draws conclusions. 
 
Related literature on accounting and discrimination  
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During recent decades, individuals, organizations and governments 
have become subject to more frequent calls for greater rationality and also for 
the adoption of more clearly defined lines of responsibility and accountability 
(Porter, 1992). As a consequence, accounting practices have assumed a status 
beyond levels previously recognised and have taken over the role of creating 
“financial” forms of visibility and rationality for abstract social and 
organizational lives ( Hopwood, 1992; Miller & Napier, 1993). Moreover, 
accounting and financial relations are expected to make a domain of behaviour 
visible and amenable to people’s intervention but also provide the information 
upon which subsequent interventions can be based (Preston et al., 1997). For 
example, Preston et al. (1997) illustrated how accounting and financial relations 
were an invisible, but powerful, method of rationing the provision of healthcare 
services to the elderly in the United States. These studies and others (e.g., Power, 
1994; Neu & Taylor, 2000; Neu et al., 2006) illustrate how accounting and 
financial relations, along with other administrative techniques such as the rule of 
law, have been used to translate abstract financial policies into practice. Neu et al. 
(2006) revealed how the ‘‘informing’’ technologies, including recommended 
accounting practices embedded within lending agreements of the World Bank 
and the IMF, make the objects of governance knowable in terms of accounting 
and financial expertise and enable, translate and regulate the behaviour of loan 
recipients.  
 
Moreover, some accounting researchers (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005; Puxty, 
1986; Tinker et al., 1991) have focussed on accounting’s role in “discrimination” 
and explained how the class struggles have been practiced within the discourse of 
CSR with the support of accounting language. They argued that the 
privileged/dominant groups generally succeed in legitimising their own agendas 
as superior to those of the lower classes through use of accounting language and 
communication. More critically, Fleischman and Tyson (2000) explored the 
interface of race and accounting by using a case study on Hawaiian sugar 
 6 
plantations during the 1835-1920 period. They reviewed the accounting 
techniques used on the plantations and provided examples of employment of 
racist policies in controlling labour, productivity and costs. However, they did not 
find records on individual-specific productivity performance and concluded that 
race rather than efficiency served as the primary measuring calculus of plantation 
work. In another study, Fleischman and Tyson (2004) adopted a more critical 
perspective of accounting’s past and examined its particular role in the 
commodification, objectification and dehumanization of an entire class of people 
(slaves) for more than 200 years. The study illustrated how accounting served 
slavery and its institutions through measurement, valuation and classification 
techniques that completely ignored the qualitative and human dimensions of 
slavery. Based on a study regarding colonization and genocide of Canada’s First 
Nations, Neu (2000) argued that the government employed accounting tactics to 
arrange things in such a way that certain ends could be achieved. His study 
focused on how accounting techniques functioned as a ”software” of imperialism 
and technology serving the ruling government to change the relationship of 
indigenous people to their land. Their analyses highlight how accounting 
techniques helped to translate policies of conquest, annihilation, containment and 
assimilation into practice, with the resultant outcomes of reproductive genocide, 
cultural genocide and ecocide. With regard to accounting’s involvement in race 
relations, Davie’s (2002) case study of the Fijian pine industry demonstrates how 
“invention of new afforestation accounting practices help to create and perpetuate 
differentiatory, racialised identities of social and economic relations”. The 
findings of this study suggest that affirmative action policies and initiatives 
constitute a form of racism.  
 
The above literature illustrates the controversial role of accounting in facilitating 
discrimination.  However, the current literature on accounting and discrimination 
has not made much effort towards understanding how accounting engages in and 
facilitates “discriminatory mobilisation” of financial capital, particularly in the 
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context of bank lending. Many banking and finance researchers are of the view 
that access to credit is limited to certain groups of society and that it is primarily 
the rich and well connected who would benefit from advancements in the 
financial system (Haber, 2004; Zhuang et al., 2009). As stated by the Governor of 
the Bank of England: “A particular problem at this end of the scale is access to 
start-up or early-stage finance for disadvantaged groups in poor neighbourhoods” 
(Bank of England, 1999, p. 207). There was a further revelation that budding 
entrepreneurs from different demographic and ethnic groups, such as Black and 
Hispanic, do not have similar opportunities to access finance, and thus some have 
less while other groups have more access to financial capital (Cavalluzzo, 
Cavalluzzo, & Wolken, 2002). However, the controversial role of accounting in 
this discriminatory bank lending context remains under-researched.   
 
3. Bourdieu’s theories of symbolic violence, habitus and domination  
 
The paper uses Bourdieu’s (Bourdieu, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1994) conceptualisation 
of symbolic violence, habitus and domination to understand how the dominant 
actors in the bank lending field secure their influence in discriminatory lending 
decisions and how they manage to reinforce discrimination. Bourdieu (1977) 
proposed the notions of field, capital and habitus to understand the static and 
dynamic aspects of an institutional field. According to Bourdieu (1998), field is 
characterized by force and struggles where individuals attempt to create a 
dominant mode of practice. At stake in the field is the accumulation of capital; 
this is both the process within and the product of the field. Bourdieu (1984) refers 
the field as a theoretical space constructed by discourse. In each field, the agents 
are categorised by their possession of a particular combination of properties 
which function as some form of capital, e.g., economic, cultural, political, 
symbolic, and then the forms of unequally shared capital create different power 
positions and relations within the field (Everett, 2002). The conflicts and 
competition arise between actors when they attempt to accumulate different types 
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of capital. The amounts of capital possessed by individual actors then determine 
the dynamic power positions and relations in the field, such as dominance, 
subordinance or equivalence (Everett, 2002). He uses the term symbolic capital to 
include such types of capital as cultural, linguistic, scientific and literary, 
depending on the field in which they are located. Symbolic capital can be 
considered as the resources available to an individual on the basis of honour, 
prestige or recognition, and serves as the value that one holds within a culture. It 
can be considered as a transubstantiated form of economic capital (Bourdieu, 
1984). Bourdieu (1984) refers to habitus as a real political space constituted by 
agents’ actions (Bourdieu, 1998). Habitus organises practices and the 
perception/evaluation of practices and the dispositions for acting, internalised by 
the individuals themselves within a field (Bourdieu, 1984). In other words, 
habitus is embodied within individual social actors and operates as a structuring 
mechanism that generates strategies for actions in the field (Everett, 2002). For 
Bourdieu (1977), the struggle is played out between the dominated, who wish to 
challenge collective habitus or taken-for-granted dispositions (doxa) within a 
given field, and the dominant, who wish to defend it.  This logic of practices is 
internalized as second nature, and forgotten as history (Bourdieu, 1990). 
Essentially, when dominant practices are naturalized and appear as a self-evident 
or basic and common way of organising various aspects of personal and 
professional lives, they are referred to as doxa (Bourdieu, 1977, 1998). Doxa 
represents socially accepted misconceptions that transfer to people through their 
socialization. According to Bourdieu, Doxa is formed by arguments and can be 
also used as a tool to form arguments.  
 
Bourdieu’s theory presents a critical explanation to the concepts of power and 
domination and discuss the relationship between dominant and dominated 
(Bourdieu, 1980). Bourdieu reconnoitres the efforts and conflicts of individuals 
to generate a dominant mode of practice and the ways that domination and power 
provide individuals with capital and create their identities. According to Bourdieu 
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(1980), language and symbolic systems are instruments of, not only knowledge 
and communication, but also domination. Thus, powerful actors use languages 
such as accounting to construct specific meanings and interpretations and impose 
their own logic as acceptable, to the extent that they control the resource 
appropriation decisions over the dominated (Bourdieu, 1976, 1980, 1992; Everett, 
2002). In this perspective, by providing rational meanings for discriminatory 
lending decisions, accounting applies symbolic power and defines the patterns of 
domination, so that dominant groups can exploit the mechanisms of the field 
(Everett, 2002). Moreover, symbolic power which promotes a hierarchy as 
legitimate is embodied in the habitus and contributes to the reproduction of 
domination (Everett, 2002). This reproduction of the dominant’s interest creates 
some form of stability for irregularities in their power positions (Malsch et al., 
2011) and by transforming petty personal interests (of dominant groups) into 
“collective interests” or “disinterests” that become “generally accepted” 
(Bourdieu, 1977, 1980, 1994). In other words, accounting language and 
techniques help symbolic violence to legitimise the reproduction of uneven 
positions of power by shaping what is agreeable or what is not. Bourdieuʼs 
concept of symbolic violence explains how order and restraint are established and 
maintained through indirect cultural mechanisms, as opposed to direct, coercive 
control (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).  
 
In summary, this paper uses Bourdieu’s conceptualisations to analyse how 
accounting redefines legitimate forms of capital and shapes habitus in the bank 
lending field. The paper’s analysis illustrates how the dominant group in the 
banking lending field uses accounting to translate discriminatory bank lending 
policies into practice and reproduce the conditions for its domination, masked by 
a discourse of consensus.  
 
4. Research methodology 
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Bourdieu (2007), in his book, Sketch for a Self-Analysis introduces a clear 
research methodology – mapping the field and exploring the practices within the 
field.  In this book, he uses the theoretical concepts devised over his career in a 
reflective socio-analysis of himself and illustrates the intellectual field that lay 
before him as a young intellectual (Everett, 2002). Bourdieu (2007) describes his 
formation of the dispositions that ultimately led him to sociology despite a 
variety of other possible careers.  Bourdieu considers research has two important 
roles: to reveal the hidden mechanisms of domination and to publish research 
beyond the academic field (Neu et al., 2006). According to Malsch et al. (2011), 
Bourdieu allows researchers to gain a better understanding of accounting as a 
field that participates in a process of domination, especially with regard to 
professionalization and accounting regulation. Moreover, Bourdieu‘s theory as a 
methodology helps to uncover the hidden mechanisms and taken-for-granted 
power relations and explain how domination is reproduced. For researchers, 
Bourdieu (2007) proposes three steps which could be used to investigate a given 
field. First, he suggests analysing the position of the field, in terms of other fields, 
as a field of power. In this respect, the control of credit by banks in Sri Lanka 
makes bank lending a very powerful and most visible field in terms of overall 
power relations within Sri Lankan society. This makes the context of the 
privately owned bank and credit culture in Sri Lanka such a good setting to 
explore and obtain field-level evidence on how accounting sustains and 
reinforces discrimination. Second, he calls for mapping out the structure of 
relations between social agents and institutions which compete for authority 
within the field. This involves the macro issue of mapping the field (as Bourdieu 
does) – what is the dominant and what is the dominated in this field and what are 
the key capitals of the bank lending field mobilised in that dominance – and how 
does this bank lending field relate to key fields of power such as the 
symbolic. Third, Bourdieu suggests an analysis of the habitus of social agents and 
the different dispositions they have acquired through internalizing their social and 
economic conditions.  This level of analysis focusses on exploring the micro 
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practices of bank lending and how individuals with a given habitus behave and 
follow given strategies (which have the effect of sustaining and reinforcing 
discrimination). Here Bourdieu’s (1976, 1980, 1992) ideas provide a good initial 
basis for explaining how and why this discrimination occurs in the bank lending 
field. Thus the data analysis of this paper is informed by Bourdieu’s 
conceptualisation of symbolic violence, habitus and domination. 
 
For the collection of data from the bank lending field, the study stems from the 
personal experience of one of the authors. It adopts an analytical auto-
ethnography of a close-held bank in Sri Lanka as its main research method. 
Based on one of the author’s recollection of accounts and insights (during the 
period 1994-2004), two case studies have been developed for subsequent analysis 
(Silverman, 1997; Yin, 2003). Data collection was carried out by reconstruction 
of participants’ own experiences and recollection of accounts (the researcher and 
two other research participants) and those of 18 other bank staff (former 
colleagues of one of the authors), with questionnaires and interviews. There were 
over 20 interviewees in total.  As one of the authors was present as a regular 
participant at board meetings of the Soft Bank, the decision-making procedures at 
the highest level of decision-making authority were observed.  Reconstruction of 
the researcher’s own experience occurred from 1994 to 2003.  The other 
participants (interviewees) had worked in banks throughout their careers and had 
held various positions ranging from teller to chief manager (a middle-level 
position).  The other colleagues/interviewees were contacted where necessary for 
cross-checking.  Reconstruction of direct observations and events “connected 
with personal experience” (Wolcott, 1994, p. 44) were primary sources of data 
collection in the research.  A set of guidelines provided by Crawford and others 
(Crawford, Kippax, & Onyz, 1992, cited in Stephenson & Papadopoulous, 2006, 
p. 58) was followed, to document the life experiences of the participants. The 
research participants, including one of the authors, were the account managers for 
the identified cases and had adequate data to use as case evidence. Based on the 
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Interview Guidelines  (see Appendix 1), they were encouraged to describe in as 
much detail as possible, the series of events and incidents they had observed 
and/or experienced during the period 1994-2004. Cross-checking with the other 
18 colleagues/interviewees occurred. In the second case, all individuals involved 
in the credit decision were able to be interviewed which included the: branch 
manager, the credit manager, recovery manager (I) and the senior recovery 
manager (II). The details of the data collected from these participants are 
provided in Appendix 2. 
 
Auto-ethnographies are commonly used in organisational studies although the 
method is relatively uncommon in accounting research (e.g., Grey & Sinclair, 
2006; Ford & Harding, 2008; Ford, Harding, & Learmonth, 2010; Humphreys & 
Learmonth, 2010; Karra & Phillips, 2008; Keenoy & Seijo, 2010; Watson, 1995, 
2008). As Anderson (2006) cited, auto-ethnography gained popularity in 
traditionally realist qualitative journals such as the Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography, Symbolic Interactions, Qualitative Sociology; in post-modern 
journals such as Qualitative Inquiry; and handbooks and book series such as 
Handbook of Qualitative Inquiry and Ethnographic Alternatives. According to 
Ellis (2004), Butler (2009) and Learmonth and Humphreys (2012), auto-
ethnography is a qualitative (interpretive) methodology that offers a particular 
way to situate oneself within the research process and its written product by 
making oneself the object of research and by developing a reflective connection 
between the researcher’s and participants’ lives. It narrates an autobiography 
ethnographically because it involves writing about the person’s past and present 
experiences even though at the time of their occurrence there was no intention of 
publishing the details of the event. These experiences are assembled using 
hindsight assisted by interviewing related persons and consulting other 
supporting evidence in the form of recorded documents. Because of the 
undeniably reflective relationship between the seeker and what is being sought, 
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auto-ethnography adds authenticity, genuineness and provides a faithful 
representation of the actual situation (Ellis, 2004).  
 
However, the auto-ethnographic method faces some criticism from fellow 
qualitative researchers. They claim that auto-ethnographers are using personal 
experience and so they use supposedly biased data (Anderson, 2006). Madison 
(2006) argues that auto-ethnographers are navel-gazers, self-absorbed narcissists 
who do not fulfil the scholarly obligations of hypothesizing, analysing and 
theorising. Responding to this critique, Pelias (2000) and Ellis et al. (2011) 
contend that auto-ethnographers acknowledge the need for rigour, theory and 
analysis in research but they also recognize the need to include elements of 
emotion, therapeutics and phenomena both from social and personal points of 
view which necessitates the writing and research in general to be evocative and 
aesthetic. Anderson (2006) also claimed that analytical auto-ethnographies 
published in organizational studies (such as the one adopted in this study), are 
always committed to an analytical agenda. Different to the evocative auto-
ethnography that captures what is going on in an individual life and social 
environment, analytical auto-ethnography provides an insider’s perspective or 
evokes emotional resonance within the reader and offers insights into some 
broader set of social phenomena than those provided by data themselves 
(Anderson, 2006). As Chang (2007) identified, analytical auto-ethnography 
methodology enhances cultural understanding of self and others and creates a 
space for self-reflection and self-examination. The authors of this paper believe 
that these characteristics and the strengths of auto-ethnography methodology 
provide better insights into the behaviour of social actors in the bank-lending 
field in Sri Lanka. In order to understand the habitus and idiosyncrasies of 
individual actors and also to analyse the influence of competing capital, 
researchers require access to real life events in the banking field (Bourdieu, 1976, 
1980, 1992). The personal experience of one of the co-authors (as the former 
chief financial officer of a closely-held bank) provides us with such rich insights 
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into how the bank chairman, senior bank officials, central bank and clients face 
each other, take alternative positions and dispositions and also exercise their 
agencies based on their ownership of capital and power.     
 
5. The banking field (privately owned banks) in Sri Lanka 
 
This section focuses on the macro issue of mapping the field (as Bourdieu’s 
methodology does) and answer to the questions such as what is the dominant and 
what is the dominated in this field,; what are the key capitals mobilised in that 
dominance and how does this field relate to key fields of power. It further reveals 
the “naturalized” (taken-for-granted) practices in the bank lending field in Sri 
Lanka.    
 
Rational accounting and credit management structure  
 
Rational accounting and credit practice protocols in privately owned banks in Sri 
Lanka are quite similar to any other mainstream banking field in the world. These 
banks are required adopt rational bank lending checklists such as the 5Cs 
(character, capacity, capital, collateral and conditions) and also stipulate the 
judgment systems and credit ratings, e.g., through external credit rating agencies 
and/or by using internal risk-scoring models. These numerical expressions, based 
on the level analysis of a person’s credit files, represent the creditworthiness of 
the loan applicant. An applicant’s credit score is primarily based on this credit 
report information sourced either from external credit agencies or from internal 
risk-scoring models. By doing so, the banks access and minimize the risk of 
credit facilities extended to their clients. For business credit, in addition to basic 
credit checklists, the banks are supposed to conduct a quantitative assessment and 
evaluate the business credit applicants’ enterprise performances. This is analyzed 
mainly through their financial accounts, in particular, through the accounting 
ratios such as leverage, profitability and liquidity ratios and also balance sheet 
 15 
information. The banks also use qualitative factors in their credit evaluation, for 
example operating experience, management expertise, and quality of assets. 
Overall, the credit approval decision is made on the basis of both qualitative and 
quantitative feasibility assessments (of an applicant’s business entity). The 
privately owned banks in Sri Lanka follow a credit policy manual (CPM) to 
control their lending-related activities. The CPM provides the necessary 
guidelines to balance compliance with regulatory requirements and profitability. 
In addition to the CPM, the circulars issued by the respective banks ensure the 
additional requirements for project appraisals to monitoring of individual 
accounts and recoveries and write-offs of badly performing accounts. These 
circulars and suchlike also provide instructions to the bank staff regarding the 
management of concessionary credit schemes. These guideline documents are 
very rich in detail and even consist of appropriate checklists and templates for 
rational credit approval (e.g., the application of the five Cs and conditions for the 
quantitative and qualitative assessment of loan applications). 
 
Key capitals and domination     
 
Because of the private economic ownership (economic capital) and the presence 
of family members and their allies in the director boards, the Chairpersons enjoy 
dominant power positions within these privately owned banks. One such example 
is the Soft Bank (case study of the paper). The Soft Group had more than 10,000 
employees, over US$80 million in net assets and US$2 billion in total assets in 
2004. The Soft Bank, which was the banking arm of the Soft Group, accounted 
for almost 50 per cent of the asset base and one-third of the workforce of the 
group. The Soft Bank had obtained special approval from the Central Bank Sri 
Lanka for direct holding of 18 per cent of its equity by the Soft Group. But, Soft 
Bank had more than 50 per cent of its ownership with the chairman, his wife and 
a few companies of the group, through indirect holdings and “Employee Share 
Ownership Schemes” (ESOS) (5 per cent of shares), which were allowed by the 
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Banking Act. Using his financial strengths, the present Chairman exploited the 
concept of ESOS to acquire the control power over the fellow shareholders of 
Soft Bank. He lent money to his most loyal employees who patronized himself 
(some were their relatives and friends) at a concessionary rate of interest to 
purchase their own shares to create six separate ESOS trusts and, each trust 
acquiring 4.99 per cent of ownership of Soft Bank. This transferred a total of 29.9 
per cent of indirect ownership and control to the Chairman. In a similar way, 
most privately owned banks in the country are owned by groups of companies 
acting in concert but camouflaged under the veil of incorporation using their 
subsidiaries to own 4.9 per cent of a particular bank. In addition to this, the bank 
owners also possess symbolic capital through the resources available on the basis 
of honour, prestige and recognition, and this signifies the value that they hold 
within Sri Lankan society, mainly because of their elite backgrounds and the 
nationally accepted business icon images. For example, one of the national-level 
universities in Sri Lanka awarded the Chairperson of the Soft Group, Mr. Perera, 
a Doctorate in 1995 for his contribution towards the business development of the 
country. A leading business magazine named him Personality of the Year 1995. 
Because of these substantial and accumulated economic and symbolic capitals, 
the chairpersons of privately owned banks are often seen allocating their time to 
personally interfere with and handle customer complaints, the plight of potential 
customers and even requests from the general public. Here, they exhibit their 
superior economic and symbolic power to their employees (particularly the bank 
managers), to manifest themselves as saviours to their customers. In the case of 
Soft Bank, its Chairman even allowed customers to confront bank managers 
openly, causing embarrassment to such employed officers.  
 
On the other hand, the managers of privately owned banks, because of their non-
financial social assets that promote social mobility beyond economic means (e.g. 
their superior educational backgrounds, embodied knowledge (of banking theory 
and practice) and education in elite schools) hold enormous cultural capital. 
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Then, on the basis of their intellectual honour as financial experts, professional 
status as leading bankers, professional work style and recognition, they also own 
symbolic capital for themselves within the privately owned banking field. 
Furthermore, these leading business people (both owners and senior managers) 
enjoy huge social capital due to their networks of relationships among people 
who live and work in Sri Lanka society, enabling them to carry out their personal 
and business lives effectively. For example, when Mr. Perera (Soft-Bank 
Chairperson) met with an accident and was admitted to  hospital in early 1996, he 
was visited there by the most venerable priests in Sri Lanka (this is an honour in 
Sri Lankan society), who prayed for him. The bank owners, highly educated 
senior bank officials and also large-scale bank clients who belong to English-
speaking, upper social classes (the elite) of society maintain cartels using social 
networks such as Old Boys’ Associations, and Rotary and Lions Clubs. Through 
these social networks these individual members accumulate social capital over 
others in the field and, as a consequence, the financiers (lenders) and borrowers 
appear to illustrate these differences in the vast gaps within social capital. Indeed, 
there is a possible inequality of power and domination in the Sri Lankan credit 
business environment to be explored further in the cases. Finally, political capital 
also plays a dominant role in the privately owned banking field. It is very 
common in Sri Lanka for Members of Parliament (MPs) to issue letters 
requesting (and forcing) senior officers of various institutions to accommodate 
the interests of their (the politicians’) supporters.   
 
Doxa and the dominated  
 
The low-income customers in the privately owned banking field have internalised 
some of the logic of these practices as second nature. These dominant practices 
have been naturalised and appeared as basic and common ways of obtaining the 
personal loans. In Sri Lankan culture, people believe that an informal approach is 
an easy way to get things done quickly. The perception of the general public is 
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that one must know someone in the bank concerned to receive a positive 
response. Even though some of the banks are private, there remains a strong 
belief and culture (doxa) in the banking field that, to obtain a credit facility, one 
must have to satisfy the bank officials. It is very common for low-income 
customers who wish to obtain credit facilities from the banks to deliver bulky 
hampers to the officers and/or branch managers of the banks.  
 
The use of consumer credit is a luxury for the majority of the dominated poor in 
Sri Lanka. Although 60 per cent of the banking sector is administered by state-
owned banks, dominated (poor) credit seekers still prefer to use privately owned 
banks because of these banks’ flexibility in applying credit rules. Branch 
managers of privately owned banks normally enjoy higher credit approval 
authority limits and power than do those of state-owned banks. Therefore, a 
patronage relationship between the customers and bank managers (and owners) 
as the mean to assess credit is a widely accepted feature (doxa) of Sri Lankan 
banking culture in all banks, irrespective of ownership type. On the other hand, 
the bank staff, including top-management-level officers, always appeared to be 
loyal (and patronised by) to the chairpersons of their respective banks because of 
their belief that the chairpersons know the trade better than they do (and believe 
them to be pundits) and in some cases, for the purpose of possible promotion, 
accepted the Chairpersons’ decisions without any questioning. For example, in 
Soft Bank, most of the bank’s support services, such as accounting, catering, 
security and printing were carried out by sister companies in the group. 
Therefore, the Soft Bank staff, including the top management officers, always 
appeared to be loyal and they accepted the Chairman’s decisions unreservedly. 
This common and prevalent practice in the privatelyowned banking field created 
a collective misconception between the bank staff and mode of domination by the 
bank owners because of the shared misrecognition and belief (doxa) by both the 
dominated and the dominating. This collective deception is embedded in a 
collective habitus among most of the staff in the privately owned bank lending 
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field. In Sri Lanka, according to Jayasundara-Smits (2010), patronage seems to 
have found renewed energy in cultural and everyday life. She explains that one of 
the reasons for this continued trend in renewed patronage ties is the persistent 
reliance of various social forces on traditional patronage relationships. More 
relevant to this study, with regard to patronage, Jayasundara-Smits (2010, p. 7) 
points out that “these relationships have not always contributed to significant 
improvements in the overall quality of life of the majority that continued to live 
under unfavourable structural and cultural conditions in the periphery”. However, 
this order and restraint have been established and maintained through indirect 
cultural mechanisms as opposed to direct, coercive control. This historically 
developed symbolic violence practice (or tradition) nurtures a conducive 
environment for decision-makers to enhance their socio-economic power base 
and establish their dominance over the dominated classes in the society.  
  
7. Soft Bank’s accounting and bank lending practice  
This section explores the micro level practices and, in particular, how individual 
actors with a given habitus behave and follow strategies which create and 
reinforce discrimination. The analysis uses Bourdieu’s notions of doxa, symbolic 
violence and domination to argue more clearly how accounting plays a role in the 
symbolic process to create and sustain discrimination. Based on one of the 
author’s recollection of accounts and insights (during the period 1994-2004) from 
the participants’ interviews (auto-ethnography), two case studies (Tony Group 
and Superclean Services) from Soft Bank (one of the leading privately owned 
banks in Sri Lanka) have been developed for subsequent analysis although at the 
time of occurrence no intention of publishing these details of events was 
conceived (Silverman, 1997; Yin, 2003). The authors believe that these two high-
profile cases represent and mirror how individuals within a given habitus deploy 
rational accounting systems at micro levels to translate discriminatory bank 
lending policies into practice and thereby sustain discrimination.  
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Patronising the chairman  
 
In the case study of the Tony Group, its owner (Mr. Tony) uses a patronage 
habitus to influence Soft Bank Chairman (Mr. Perera) and obtain US$1.5 million 
loan to finance input materials for his loss-making business. He used his personal 
connections, networks (social capital) to please the Soft Bank Chairman. As 
previously mentioned, the Soft Bank Chairman is embedded in extensive social 
networks of friends, business partners and high profile customers, groups within 
which he can discuss business and personal life ambitions, such as becoming a 
national-level leader.  
 
The Tony Group is one of the largest garment manufacturers in Sri Lanka, 
producing a significant share of the country’s exports and employing over 25,000 
workers. Mr. Tony (the owner of Tony Group) had won several awards for his 
achievements. He had maintained a very close working relationship with a past 
Sri Lankan president and enjoyed state patronage, including credit facilities from 
state-owned banks, to expand his business in line with government policy at the 
time. Mr. Tony had become a powerful businessman and gained a prominent 
position in an elite circle in Sri Lankan social networks. He was building his 
socio-economic power not only within the garment manufacturing industry, but 
also more generally. But, with a change of government and political regime in the 
country, he had started facing problems. He had complained that he was not 
allocated an adequate quota to allow his factories to work at full capacity. This 
financial situation had forced him to apply for a credit facility from the Soft 
Bank. Mr. Tony approached the Soft Bank Chairman while he was conducting 
one of the bank’s review meetings and requested an immediate appointment to 
discuss his urgent matter. The response of the Soft Bank Chairman was to 
arrange a quick appointment/meeting, showing respect for Mr. Tony’s reputation 
as a fellow business tycoon.  
 21 
 
However, Mr. Tony had made a previous application for credit facilities from 
Soft Bank, but had been rejected by the credit officer because of an official 
credit-default investigation report. Mr. Tony and the Soft Bank Chairman (Mr. 
Perera) knew each other as leading businesspersons working in different fields in 
Sri Lanka. Therefore, the Soft Bank Chairman’s approach to Mr. Tony’s new 
application for the credit facilities was very casual; thus all previous negative 
accounting figures were ignored and the formal credit approval rules were 
bypassed. Mr. Tony defended his poor accounting figures and financial 
performances by saying that his group was running with a negative cash flow 
only because of the under-utilisation of assets. He was in the midst of a crisis, and 
stated that he had no money to pay the salary bill even for that month. The best 
employees were leaving the group and he said he had no option but to agree to 
the foreclosure that had been suggested by the existing banks. He also pointed out 
that the new owners of his business would not be able to maintain the same 
rapport with the international buyers and that the whole episode would result in 
tragedy, making 25,000 workers redundant. He pleaded with the Soft Bank 
Chairman to bail him out, assuring him that a Soft Bank credit line would 
rejuvenate the whole group and that future cash flows would be very healthy with 
incoming orders expected. He also requested a Letter of Credit (LC) facility to 
import the necessary fabrics.  
 
At the request of the Soft Bank Chairman (Mr. Perera), Mr. Tony explained his 
cash-flow situation and borrowing position. The total borrowings of the Tony 
Group were more than US$20 million. These comprised US$5 million from the 
Bank of Lanka, US$5 million from SET Bank, US$2 million from HAT Bank 
and a syndicated loan of US$8 million from all three banks. He had borrowed 
from three private banks and the Bank of Lanka, the largest state-owned bank in 
Sri Lanka, which had structured a syndicated loan as well. The monthly 
commitment for servicing these loans was US$0.7 million. Due to non-servicing 
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of interest, almost all the banks had classified the Tony Group as a defaulter and 
had reported this to the Credit Information Bureau (CIB), which is the central 
monitoring authority. When evaluating the creditworthiness of a client, the first 
thing a credit officer has to do is to call for a CIB report on the client. Mr. Tony 
had applied for a facility from the Soft Bank a week previously, and the team 
leader of the Corporate Credit Division had declined it on the basis of the CIB 
report. Mr. Tony was ingratiatingly convincing; he explained with humble 
politeness how the senior officers of the Soft Bank had come to reject his 
proposal and, in advance, he praised the Chairman for his visionary leadership 
and patriotic attitudes. The Chairman (Mr. Perera) expressed his grief about the 
situation and blamed the politicians, regulators and bankers for not identifying 
the needs of the country.   
 
The Soft Bank Chairman said that bankers were guided by some rules called 
banking practices, which can ruin potential enterprises. According to the 
recollection of the observer, Soft Bank Chairman had said: 
…they will never think beyond that cage of banking practices. Even our 
state policies do not have provisions to support people like you [Mr. 
Tony]. Now, you have generated 25,000 jobs. If they lose their jobs and 
you lose your business, the cost to the economy will be much more in the 
long run. 
Then, in a discouraged tone, Chairman had said: 
I don’t know when these people will learn these things. 
Mr. Tony seconded this and in particular supported the views of Soft Bank 
Chairman and started criticizing the prevailing systems. Then Mr. Tony and the 
Soft Bank Chairman, according to the observer’s best recollection, engaged in the 
following conversation: 
Chairman: “Tell me Mr. Tony, how much do you want? And what is the 
collateral you can offer?”  
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Mr. Tony: “Sir, all my assets have been taken by the existing banks. I can 
give my personal guarantee and the secondary mortgage of the assets, 
which have already been mortgaged to the other banks, and Chairman 
Sir, believe me and I will not let you down.” 
Chairman: “Your house?” 
Mr. Tony: “That’s in my wife’s name and I am sorry sir, I can’t draw her 
into this, she will eat me.”  
Chairman: “Can you give your wife’s personal guarantee?” 
Mr. Tony: “I am very sorry sir, but do not worry I will never let you down 
and I will pay every cent due to your bank on time, and I am not going to 
deal with any of those other banks in the future, my one and only bank is 
your bank for the rest of my life.”  
Chairman: “Ok, tell me your requirement, have you got a good 
accountant? Do you have the cash-flow projections?”  
Mr. Tony: “Yes sir, our cash flow is always positive but not adequate to 
service the loans because of production hiccups and not running our 
factories at their full capacity. If you help we can have enough orders to 
fill the factories to perform at full capacity. We will then have an initial 
cash surplus of US$1 million and that would grow to US$1.5 million in 
three months’ time. To do this I need an advance of US$2.5 million to pay 
my salary bill and other statutory dues. And I need an LC facility of 
US$1.5 million to finance input materials for uninterrupted production.”  
 
The financial controller then tabled a monthly cash-flow projection and explained 
it, and the Soft Bank Chairman looked convinced. 
 
Chairman: “Is that all you need? Tell me right now; you will not be 
assisted under the normal banking practices by our credit officers in the 
bank.”  
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Mr. Tony: “Yes, that’s what I wanted your Honour. I do not need a cent 
more than what is necessary.” 
Mr. Tony invited the Chairman to chair his board: “Why don’t you come 
and chair our Board meetings as well?”  
The Chairman thanked him for the invitation and said: “I don’t want to 
interfere with your business, you are the best person to manage your 
business, but you can give us good publicity.”  
Mr. Tony: “Of course, sir,” Mr. Tony readily agreed.  
 
The above story demonstrates a situation where a borrower exercised the 
“patronage” habitus and also used his social capital to influence the credit 
decision-makers; on the other hand the Soft Bank Chairman, because of his 
pundit self-image habitus (his omniscient belief) used his symbolic capital, 
bypassing all the negative accounting information produced by his and Mr. 
Tony’s accountants, to convince the Soft Bank board of directors to ratify his 
casual and biased decisions. Whilst the mastery of technical competencies is 
generally associated with the professional accountants (or financial controllers), 
the above case study indicates that the knowledge about basic/elementary 
accounting practice and superficial regard of the accounting controls and figures 
(by the Soft Bank chairman) still play a central and unshakable role in the Soft 
Bank Chairman’s habitus of a pundit self-image (that of “knowing everything”). 
Indeed, accounting practices here provided a convenient and acceptable 
officializing strategy and symbolic power to Soft Bank Chairman (Mr. Perera) 
when he was legitimising his interests within lending decisions. Moreover, the 
Soft Bank Chairman also managed to reinforce his own social capital. Mr. Tony 
(loan applicant) and the Soft Bank Chairman both belonged to the same social 
class and knew each other as leading businesspersons in Sri Lanka. They both 
were well known and powerful and had been prominent in the elite circles and 
social networks in Sri Lanka. The personal connection with the owner was the 
influential factor in creating this situation of bias and favoritism, and the making 
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of a discriminatory loan approval decision. In this context, specifically, 
accounting facilitated a form of symbolic violence and is implicated in the credit 
approval mechanisms by which powerful actors, such as Soft Bank Chairman, 
consolidated their influence and secured their position. 
 
Chairman’s Pundit omniscient self-image  
 
This section further analyses the habitus of the Soft Bank Chairman which is 
comprised of durable and transposable dispositions, and draws attention to the 
enduring logic and functionality of discriminatory use of accounting practices. 
The career habitus of an individual can be defined by the dispositions which tend 
to be automatically actualized within the field of career (Krais, 1988). The 
actualization of such dispositions depends mainly on contextual opportunities but 
also a socio‐psychological portrait of each individual in a work context. In this 
perspective, the Soft Bank Chairman (Mr. Perera) drew upon his position at the 
Soft Bank (with accumulated economic capital), social and symbolic capital 
which he had built up by being in the business over 40 years. In particular, he laid 
claim to his designation as Chairman in his group of companies and as a public 
figure promoting national economic development. He then also leveraged this 
organizational location to deal almost exclusively with subordinates and 
customers through his elite contacts, such as upper-class family background, 
Rotary and Lions club memberships. By using this form of social capital, he has 
been enabled to solidify his position and to place his personal stamp on its 
realiszation. The Soft Bank Chairperson established himself as a charismatic 
leader and created a patriotic and charismatic image in public. Symbolically he 
appeared to others as someone who seems to know without having learned those 
behaviours and common references that distinguish a leader. In Mr. Perera’s 
(Chairperson’s) persona, this is attributable to his speaking English, his public 
school education and the way such an elite family acquired cultural and symbolic 
capital that translated into an omniscient habitus then accepted by the fellow staff 
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members of the Soft Bank, members of his own social class and clubs and in 
wider society (his portrait as a national figure and business icon). In addition, his 
official position in the organization and the group as the Chairperson (and his 
ownership of economic capital), gave him a leadership right to impose a “social 
vision of the world”. This created potential for symbolic violence within Mr. 
Perera’s leadership as his followers believed he was a charismatic figure, even 
though he had violated many basic principles of a good leader in his managerial 
decision-making, for example, through breaking all the accounting controls and 
credit evaluation rules, over-ruling his fellow staff’s credit management decisions 
(often without consultation), making biased credit approval decisions and 
promoting favouritism.  
 
To elaborate further, Soft Bank Chairman (Mr. Perera) was seen to consistently 
make reference to, and activate, some very elementary forms of accounting 
practices, summed up by what he described as balance sheet management. This 
encompassed having a very good practical and situated knowledge of rates of 
profitability, cash flows, and the relationship between debt and equity and so on, 
both generally and in the context of Soft Bank and his group of companies. These 
practices comprised a very important part of the omniscient habitus of Mr. Perera 
in his capacity as the Chairman. Thus his incorporation of these basic accounting 
practices provided him with a background for understanding and instigating 
actions across a range of different situations. The case evidence shows that these 
practices had served him well in the past, over a long career, permitting him to 
function in a variety of different work contexts, e.g., economic sectors, industries 
and with clients.  
 
The above characteristics of Soft Bank Chairman (Mr. Perera) were largely 
evident in the Tony Group case study. Thus, the Chairperson had quickly reached 
an assessment of Mr. Tony’s integrity, and the risk and return of the credit 
involved, and he instantly granted US$4 million. The Chairperson was not 
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anticipating any personal gratification but showed some sympathy for the 
workforce of the Tony Group, who were without wages and facing redundancy 
because of the foreclosure of factories that had been called by the other banks to 
recover their debts. By doing so, Mr. Perera managed to strengthen his public 
figure image and symbolic power. The following day, the business page of a 
leading newspaper carried an article entitled, “Soft Bank rescued Tony Group”. 
The news spread fast and Mr. Tony announced that Mr. Perera had helped him. 
He issued a special circular among the Tony Group employees, telling them they 
had to all do their banking with the Soft Bank, explaining that the Soft Bank was 
a truly kind bank, while criticizing all other banks for pushing him to sell the 
factories. The Chairperson was jubilant about the publicity and copies of the 
clipping of the news item circulated among the board members at the next board 
meeting. He assured the board that he would bring more and more business and 
expressed his regrets, saying that he should have involved himself more in the 
day-to-day activities of the bank earlier (referring to the accounting controls and 
credit decisions). The Chairperson requested that Mr. Tony give the maximum 
publicity for this rescue operation in reciprocation, and rejected the Chairmanship 
of the Tony group which was offered by Mr. Tony. Mr. Tony, exercising his 
patronising habitus, duly provided maximum publicity to Soft Bank Chairman. 
However, despite all these dramatic publicity moves by Mr. Tony, later the Tony 
group’s business collapsed, the Soft Bank loan was classified as a bad debt and 
provisions were made to comply with the regulatory requirements. The interest 
loss was reported to be around US$0.3 million and the capital loss was also 
significant. This case evidence reflects how the Soft Bank Chairman mobiliszed 
the elementary accounting practices embedded in his pundit self-image to create a 
basis for a relational distinction. Thus he was able to perform a key lending 
decision in a discriminatory way that was distinguished from the rational 
mechanisms set up by his accomplishments from those of other top managers and 
financial controllers in Soft Bank. Interestingly, none of these top managers or 
financial controllers sought to distinguish their position by challenging the views 
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of the Soft Bank Chairman. The reason for that was that the Soft Bank Chairman 
had mobilized significant symbolic and cultural capital to justify and implement 
his decisions. The accounting played a substantial role in this symbolic process to 
create and sustain discrimination.  
 
In a different perspective, Soft Bank Chairman’s vision became bound up in the 
Soft Bank credit approval culture where he believed Soft Bank credit policy 
should symbolize commitment to Sri Lankan national economic development 
(e.g., Mr. Tony’s loan-approval case). The team leader of the Soft Bank’s 
corporate credit division indicated that the Mr. Tony’s application was declined 
on the basis of the CIB report. But, over-ruling the corporate credit division 
decision, the Chairperson exhibited favouritism and instantly granted US$4 
million to Mr. Tony. In this recommendation, the staff of the corporate credit 
division had accepted the fact that they were not free to make credit appraisals, 
but were expected to anticipate what would be acceptable to the Chairman’s 
visionary, patriotic and upper-class tastes. In other words, they misconstrued their 
role as being unquestioning of authority and instigated a situation of symbolic 
violence. Thus the Soft Bank credit culture served as a way of securing Mr. 
Perera’s legacy, of legitimizing his own charismatic authority and ensuring its 
continuation into the future as objectified symbolic violence both within the Soft 
Bank and more widely, within the country. By doing so, he might have expected 
that this could be converted into a form of cultural capital with a future top post 
in the government. This connects with the fact that he maintained close 
connections with powerful politicians, especially with the former government of 
the country. The Chairperson often strode up and down while speaking from the 
heart to his Soft Bank staff and clients about his vision for the country, and his 
belief in the Soft Bank’s contribution to national economic development. This 
patriotic rhetoric is central to the process of creating an emotional “identification” 
with the Soft Bank chairman, as it communicates a feeling of oneness between 
himself (as a charismatic leader) and his followers (bank staff, clients and 
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society). This misrecognition of power relations as personal relations embodies a 
practice of symbolic violence.  
 
The Financial Controllers who participated in the credit evaluation decisions of 
Soft Bank then were seen to accept and endorse the legitimacy of the dominant 
values and classification schema associated with it, as imposed by the most 
powerful, in this case the Soft Bank Chairman. Thus, the Soft Bank Chairman 
was not content to allow others in the accounting and finance function to get their 
work done as he was always involved in detailed intervention and interference; 
he was keen to be informed of the progress of projects and impending difficulties; 
he was more likely to manage using talk rather than written forms of 
communication; he was predisposed to the perquisites of high office; he actively 
sought to cultivate the influence of symbolic power, bringing a high degree of 
political acuity to his position; and, he was predisposed to question his own staff 
and initiate favouritism to his clients through the implementation of 
discriminatory accounting information. One of the other potential reasons for the 
above-stated silence of bank managers was their desire for promotion into the 
senior positions of the bank and a perception of the Chairman as the gatekeeper 
to such a future that overrode any dissatisfaction with the established credit 
management climate. In pursuing their own goals then, the bank managers 
engaged in social practices that contributed to the existing structure and helped to 
reproduce it. In this respect, the complicity of the dominated actors (bank 
managers) becomes obvious as an essential element within symbolic violence 
that can only be exerted on a person predisposed, through the habitus, to feel it. 
 
Exchanging personal favours  
 
Some Soft Bank clients used the habitus of exchanging personal favours to obtain 
credit facilities. They experienced a dominated class situation (primarily formed 
by financial constraints and poor social capital prevailing in their socialisation) 
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largely of an inert disposition. One such example was how a Mr. Silva (owner of 
Superclean services) managed his relationships with the Soft Bank branch 
managers. Mr. Silva, who came from a Colombo suburb, was in his late forties. 
He took advantage of an early retirement plan from his employer Timber 
Corporation, a semi-governmental corporation, and decided to start a business. In 
1991, he formed a sole proprietorship, Superclean Services, to provide janitorial 
services on a commercial basis. His first client was the Dehiwela branch of the 
Soft Bank, which was the first branch of the Soft Bank. His service proved to be 
most satisfactory so he was contracted for all the janitorial services for the bank. 
As the Soft Bank expanded its branch network rapidly, Superclean’s business, as 
the sole janitorial service provider, also boomed. Mr. Fernando, the manager of 
Dehiwela branch, handled the Superclean account systematically, financing its 
initial capital investment requirements to serve the newly opened branches. The 
recovery process was streamlined by directing the payments from the Soft Bank 
to the loan account of Superclean. Superclean was exceptionally good at meeting 
the requirements of finishing up at branch openings, mostly at short notice, and 
sometimes at concurrent branch openings. Furthermore, Mr. Silva supplied all 
these services free of charge for the opening day polish-ups, strengthening the 
firm’s relationship with the bank.  
 
As the business was small in scale, Mr. Silva was not known to the top 
management of the Soft Bank. Mr. Silva had accumulated considerable assets in 
his business and always had substantial payments due from the bank, against 
which he had facilities including an overdraft. His ambition was to provide 
services to big institutions such as the Parliament, airport and embassies. Mr. 
Silva was trying to accumulate social capital through networking because he 
thought that would help him to promote his business growth. For that purpose he 
invested more in business promotions and subsequently created a liquidity 
problem. The branch manager at Dehiwala Branch, Mr. Fernando, was worried 
about continuing requests by Mr. Silva for additional credit facilities and/or 
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overdue loans. However, Mr. Silva claimed that he had overdue money from the 
bank. He was unable to prove his claim because of his limited accounting 
knowledge and expertise. Mr. Silva used his habitus of personal favours, such as 
polishing the home floors of bank officers who did him even the slightest favour. 
Mr. Silva, who operated in a small, city-based company, also used his habitus of 
style (the personal stamp) to gain favour to get access to resources. Then the 
personal favours from Mr. Silva to the bank officers had become an established 
practice. However, his inability to cope with the continuous requests made by 
down-the-line staff (in addition to the managers) caused irritation within staff 
circles. Some of the bank officials who were not rewarded by Mr. Silva made a 
point of complaining that the Superclean services were not up to standard. In 
response, the Soft Bank branch managers started to cut payments for the slightest 
lapse or error made by Superclean staff. Moreover, branch managers sought 
permission from the CEO of the bank to allow them to be responsible for their 
own janitorial needs, and took away the Superclean employees by hiring them to 
their branches on a contract basis. 
 
Meanwhile, Mr. Nath, who was in charge of janitorial services at ABC Ltd, an 
established large company in the same business as Superclean, approached the 
Soft Bank through the Personal Assistant (PA) to the CEO. The PA, who was an 
old classmate of Mr. Nath (in Nath’s social network), was placed fully in charge 
of the bank’s janitorial services and started to divide the branch janitorial work 
between the two contenders, ABC and Superclean. However, it was still expected 
that Superclean would attend to the opening day’s work for new branches, which 
was offered free, and thereafter it was the PA who decided to give which branch 
to whom. Simultaneously, Mr. Fernando, manager of the Dehiwela Branch, was 
promoted and transferred to the head office and the credit officer of the Dehiwela 
Branch, where Mr. Silva had his account, became a powerful figure in the branch. 
The credit officer, who was not on very good terms with Mr. Silva as a result of a 
misunderstanding (caused by Mr. Silva’s refusal to offer a particular personal 
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favour), started treating the Superclean account with discipline in the strictest 
sense, ignoring delays in receiving bank payments thereto and thus depriving Mr. 
Silva of business expansion. The intervention in janitorial business by the PA (to 
the Soft Bank CEO) had further aggravated the issue. Mr. Silva experienced a 
severe liquidity crunch and gradually lost business because the Soft Bank did not 
issue any performance bonds for Superclean to canvass new clients. It also 
returned all cheques if funds were lacking and no arrangements had been made. 
Finally, the Soft Bank did not extend the advances against payments from the 
bank and did not allow withdrawals from his account until overdues were cleared 
(despite payments to him from the bank having been overdue for months).  
 
However, it was later revealed that the Soft Bank Dehiwela branch had over-
recovered Superclean’s loan (charged) interest, substantially enough to recover 
half the term loan. Superclean, which was too small to afford qualified or 
experienced accountants, was totally reliant on the bank statements to assess their 
daily finances. Mr. Silva’s accounting literacy was not sufficient to understand 
his personal accounting reports and statements. Soft Bank classified the 
Superclean account as non-performing and transferred the file to the recoveries 
department for closely monitored recovery action, failing which the Soft Bank 
could serve a Letter of Demand to proceed towards legal action. After careful 
examination of the account, and realising that the Soft Bank had overcharged 
interest and pushed the client to the non-performing condition, the recoveries 
manager comprehended Mr. Silva’s plight in all aspects, i.e., the overcharging of 
interest; the non-recovery of capital whilst funds were actually available (due 
from the bank) causing a loss situation to the client; and the deprivation of 
business expansion, which was, arguably, criminal negligence in the banking 
sense. In contrast to the Tony Group owner, Mr. Silva lacked social capital and 
also lacked proper accounting knowledge and literacy, and was neglected by the 
credit decision makers of Soft Bank. This case brought discriminatory actions to 
the surface and underlined the increasing importance of social capital, such as 
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social networks, group memberships and the connections needed to access credit 
from the privately owned banks in countries like Sri Lanka.  
 
Moreover, the case evidence strongly suggests that banks which embed the credit 
decisions with the borrowers in their social networks (those with social capital) 
offer favourable decisions on loans. On the other hand, credit applicants were 
more unlikely to get bank credit if their social capital (the network of ties with the 
Chairman and senior bank staff) provided them with unequal or arm’s length ties. 
The authors contend that the more commercial transactions are embedded in 
social attachments, the more there are expectations of trust governing exchanges. 
These unequal, or arm’s length ties, and weak social capital forced the Soft Bank 
loan applicants to disposition themselves and practice actions such as exchanging 
personal favours, to get closer to the branch managers. In particular, exchanging 
personal favours filled the gaps in arm’s-length ties and provided a platform for 
the collaboration, resulting in different economic consequences (as the case 
evidence demonstrated). This habitus of personal favours from Mr. Silva turned 
into a taken-for-granted and unquestioned truth (doxa) among the Soft Bank staff 
and formed a state of symbolic violence, as this collective deception practised on 
the borrower by the bank staff created misrecognition between dominated and 
dominating. This correlates with the evidence that bank staff considered Mr. 
Silva had a formal obligation to offer them personal favours. In fact, some of the 
bank officials complained about Mr. Silva (for the quality of Superclean 
Services’ work) to higher authorities, simply because he was unable to serve 
down-the-line bank staff. This misrecognition of power relations as obligation 
from the borrower’s perspective is one of the properties of symbolic violence.  
 
Bank managers’ opportunistic behaviour 
 
Usually, there can be two ways to form a career-related habitus: through 
accumulation of educational, economic and social capital within the family of 
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origin and through personality traits and social and strategic behavioral 
dispositions for social contacts (Krais, 1988). The Soft Bank managers used the 
latter and practiced an opportunistic behavior habitus for their career 
advancements. When doing so, they produced discriminatory accounting 
practices and strategically violated the basic banking lending procedures of the 
Soft Bank. For example, in the case of Superclean’s owner Mr. Silva, because of 
the continuous harassments by the Soft Bank’ recoveries manager at the time, had 
lost all his credibility and business integrity and was unable to pursue tender bids 
without performance bonds. The only business that Superclean had at the time 
was supplying cleaning services to a few branches in the civil war areas of the 
country (the North and East) where ABC (the competitor of the cleaning 
business) was reluctant to work. At one point, the recoveries manager called for 
explanations by the Soft Bank hierarchy about the overcharged interest from the 
new branch manager of the Dehiwela branch. A senior bank officer indicated that 
this action (the call for explanation) probably might not have been intended to 
take action against the errant staff but perhaps to build up a case and find an 
avenue to help a victim of errant bank action. The recoveries manager, 
comprehending Mr. Silva’s plight, extended several bank facilities which were 
outside the normal credit rules. The recoveries manager blamed the branch staff 
for Mr. Silva’s situation but, rather than reporting the misbehaviour to 
management, used his awareness of it to intimidate the branch staff. The 
recoveries manager used the reduction shown in the bad loans he handled as a 
performance measure to control and influence branch staff. If the recoveries 
manager could transfer restructured bad loans back to branches as performing 
loans, that process would have enhanced his own performance (on paper), for 
which he would have been rewarded. But the recoveries manager did not have the 
necessary authority to approve new credit facilities. He abused his authority and 
had an advantage, as the branch staff were under obligation to him for his failure 
to report their lapse. Though the recoveries manager’s performance earned him 
promotion and top management encouragement, as soon as his approval of credit 
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beyond the limits of his authority was discovered, he was dismissed from his 
position. 
 
The new chief manager, recovery, a retired orthodox banker, applied the 
established credit rules strictly. He stopped all the facilities extended to 
Superclean by the recoveries manager and requested Mr. Silva to settle existing 
outstanding debt immediately before he would consider further facilities. The 
new chief manager, recovery, through practicing opportunistic behaviour also 
tried to impress the top management with his good work. He contemplated 
serving a letter of demand threatening legal action against Mr. Silva and his 
house, which was mortgaged to the Soft Bank. Mr. Silva, as advised by people 
who were aware of the best way to approach the Chairperson (Mr. Perera), had 
searched for avenues to make such an approach. However, unlike Mr. Tony, Mr. 
Silva did not belong to the Soft bank Chairperson’s social class or social network. 
Research participants were of the view that, if Mr. Silva had ensured sufficient 
social contacts to approach the Chairperson, he could have obtained the necessary 
facilities, and the recoveries manager would have been rewarded with another 
promotion instead of losing his job. The career-related habitus of obtaining 
professional banking knowledge and accounting qualifications, and the 
expression of that ability in financial accounting and credit management tasks 
had created a unique knowledge power situation amongst the bank staff over their 
loan applicants (clients). In this respect, professional banking knowledge and 
qualifications was a form of institutionalised cultural capital, symbolic capital (or 
both), and was perceived by the bank staff (especially the branch managers) as 
transferable to economic capital. The bank managers gained recognition at the 
institutional level, most commonly because of their academic credentials, 
accounting and banking qualifications and experience/knowledge. Therefore, 
most of them tried to individually compare their ownership of cultural capital 
against that of others. Consequently, the apparent shortage of such capital 
encouraged some managers to practice the career habitus of continually 
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manoeuvring to improve their performance, organizational position and status in 
relation to each other. They also attempted to convert their cultural capital into 
economic capital by demonstrating their personal value (through superior 
performance against others) to the Chairperson. This promoted a culture of 
opportunistic behaviour amongst the Soft Bank staff. For example, the junior 
recoveries manager in the Superclean case study called for explanations about the 
overcharged interest from the branch manager. He then used the reduction shown 
in the bad loans he handled as the performance measure to branch staff and also 
went beyond his authority to approve extended facilities to Superclean, outside 
the normal credit rules of Soft Bank. Consequently, the chief manager, recovery, 
tried to impress top management by exposing the wrongdoings of his junior 
manager. On the basis of misused authority, the junior recoveries manager was 
then dismissed from his position. This story reflects how the bank staff who were 
short of the necessary cultural capital to gain higher positions within the Soft 
Bank, exercised exploitative tactics and encouraged opportunistic behaviour 
amongst their own community. On the other hand, because of the Soft Bank 
Chairman’s “knowing everything” and bank managers’ “opportunistic 
behaviour”, the financial controllers of Soft Bank were forced to practice the 
most elementary of the practising accountants’ competencies, even though their 
mastery of technical competencies is generally associated with the development 
of novice accounting practitioners. The case evidence indicates that such 
elementary practices dominated the credit practices of Soft Bank and played a 
central and abiding role in the general career habitus of expert exponents of the 
accounting craft.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The paper analysed the links between accounting and discrimination, and 
illustrated how accounting techniques help to translate discriminatory bank 
lending policies into practice, and create and reinforce discrimination. In order to 
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address this situation, it has presented an empirical study, based on data gathered 
through an analytical auto-ethnography (during the period 1994-2004) coupled 
with follow-up interviews and reiterated analyses within a within a privately 
owned Sri Lankan bank, drawing out the conditions that allowed two stories of 
accounting and discriminatory bank lending to be established. It also used a 
theoretical framework based on Bourdieu’s concepts of field, capital, habitus, 
doxa, symbolic violence and domination. Such concepts are applicable in 
explaining and arguing more clearly how accounting plays a key role in a 
symbolic process to create and sustain discrimination in the bank lending field.  
 
Previous studies have highlighted a nexus between the accounting and 
discrimination. For instance, Fleischman and Tyson (2000) analysed the interface 
of race and accounting, Fleischman and Tyson (2004) discussed accounting and 
slavery, and Neu (2000) explained the connection between accounting techniques 
and reproductive genocide, cultural genocide and ecocide. Moreover, Davie’s 
(2002) research highlighted how the accounting involved in race relations creates 
and perpetuates differentiatory, racialised identities of social and economic 
relations. However, none of these studies provides any understanding of how 
accounting creates and sustain discrimination in the privately owned bank 
lending field. This paper thus seeks to fill this gap in the literature and shows 
how, in a bank lending field in which economic, social, cultural and symbolic 
capital are so dominant, the powerful actors, such as a Chairman and bank 
managers, use accounting information, tools and accounts to exert symbolic 
violence. This is accepted by both those who exert it (a Chairman, some bank 
managers) and those who are subject to it (bank customers without social capital 
and power, some bank staff). They use manipulated accounting to create 
disproportionate power structures and make bank lending decisions perceived as 
objective. The paper thus demonstrated that accounting information, tools and 
accounts themselves were deliberately “smoothed” to reinforce unequal positions 
of power and shape the interests of the dominant (e.g., powerful bank owners and 
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some managers). As a result, the dominated actors, rather than resisting, 
exercised their agency through habitus (exchanging favours, patronage on the 
part of the chairman, and opportunistic behaviours) in order to influence the 
dominant actors to make advantageous decisions and ontologically secure their 
own positions in the organization. One unique feature though, was the undit (or 
omniscient belief) habitus of the Chairman. This has contributed to further 
reproduce accounting-led discrimination and also created a situation exhibiting 
symbolic power and violence. Thus, the Chairman, through use of 
basic/elementary levels of accounting knowledge has justified his discriminatory 
bank lending decisions in favour of his clients who practiced business within the 
habitus of patronage. Finally, the paper reveals the ways the dominant actors (for 
example, a Chairman) relate accounting controls and information to common 
sense discourses (for example, visionary leadership and patriotic attitudes) and 
conceal rational organizational practices (for example, rational accounting and 
credit control systems) to create and legitimize disproportionate symbolic power 
positions.  
 
The paper broadly expands the accounting research that attempts to understand 
how forms of accounting emerge from, sustain and modify wider institutional and 
social practices, such as discrimination. It further demonstrates the accounting’s 
embeddedness on different forms of habitus, such as patronage, omniscient self-
beliefs, exchanging personal favours, and opportunistic behaviour. Besides this, 
the paper underlines the controversial role of accounting in a powerful symbolic 
process that recognize, produce and reproduce practical dispositions for day‐to‐
day work practices.   
  
References 
 
Anderson, L. (2006) Analytic autoethnography. Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography, 35(4), 373–395. 
 39 
Bank of England. (1999) Speech by the Governor at the KPMG profitability 
seminar; Speech given by Edward George, Governor of the Bank of 
England, 1 March 1999. Retrieved from 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speech
es/ 
1999/speech37.pdf 
Boltanski, L. & Chiapello, E. (2005) The new spirit of capitalism. London: Verso 
[Original edition 1999]. Le nouvel esprit du capitalisme.[The new spirit of 
capitalism]. Paris, France: Gallimard. 
Bourdieu, P. (1976) Les modes de domination. Actes de la Recherche en Sciences 
Sociales, 2(2), 122–132. 
Bourdieu, P. (1977) Sur le pouvoir symbolique. Annales. Histoire, Sciences 
Sociales, 32(3), 405–411. 
Bourdieu, P. (1977) Outline of a theory of practice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Bourdieu, P. (1980) Le sens pratique, Paris, France: Editions de Minuit. 
Bourdieu, P. (1984) Distinction. Cambridge, UK: Polity. 
Bourdieu, P. (1986) The production of belief: Contribution to an economy of 
symbolic goods. In R. Collins (Ed.), Media, culture and society: A critical 
reader (pp. 131–163). London, UK: Sage Publications.  
Bourdieu, P. (1990) The logic of practice. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press.  
Bourdieu, P. (1998) Practical reason: On the theory of action. Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press. 
Bourdieu, P. (2007) Sketch for a self-analysis. Chicago, IL: The University of 
Chicago Press.  
Bourdieu, P., & Wacquant, L. J. D. (1992) An invitation to reflexive sociology. 
Oxford, UK: Polity Press. 
Butler, B. (2009) How can structural film expand the language of experimental 
ethnography? PhD thesis, University of the Arts, London. 
 40 
Cavalluzzo, K., Cavalluzzo, L. and Wolken, J. (2002) “Competition, Small 
Business Financing, and Discrimination: Evidence From a New Survey,” 
Journal of Business, October, VOL. 75:4, p. 641-680. 
Chang, H. (2007) Autoethnography: Raising cultural awareness of self and 
others. In G. Walford (Ed.), Methodological developments in 
ethnography. Studies in educational ethnography (Vol. 12, pp. 201–221). 
Boston, MA: Elsevier. 
Davie, S. S. K. (2002)) The policies of accounting, race, and ethnicity: A story of 
a chiefly-based preferencing, conference paper. Fifth Critical Perspective 
on Accounting Conference, Baruch College, CUNY. . 
Ellis, C. S. (2004) The ethnographic I: A methodological novel about 
autoethnography. Walnut Creek, CA: Altamira Press. 
Ellis, C., Adams, T. E., & Bochner, A. P. (2011) Autoethnography: an overview. 
Historical Social Research: 273–290. 
Everett, J. (2002)  Organizational research and the praxeology of Pierre 
Bourdieu, Organizational Research Methods, 5(1), 56–80.  
Fleischman, R. K., & Tyson, T. N. (2000) The interface of race and accounting: 
the case of Hawaiian sugar plantations, 1835-20041920. Accounting 
History, 5(7), 7–32. 
Fleischman, R. K. & Tyson, T. N. (2004) Accounting in service to racism: 
monetizing Slave property in the antebellum South. Critical Perspectives 
on Accounting, 15(3), 376–399.  
Ford, J., & Harding, N. (2008). Fear and loathing in Harrogate or a study of a 
conference. Organization, 15(2), 233–250. 
Ford, J., Harding, N., & Learmonth, M. (2010) Who is it that would make 
business schools more critical? Critical reflections on critical management 
studies. British Journal of Management, 21, 71–81. 
Grey, C., & Sinclair, A. (2006) Writing differently. Organization, 13, 443–453. 
 41 
Haber, S. H. (2004) Mexico’s experiments with bank privatisation and 
liberalisation, 1991–2004. Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 2325–
2353. 
Hopwood, A. G. (1992) Accounting calculation and the shifting sphere of the 
economic. The European Accounting Review, 1, 125–143.  
Humphreys M., & Learmonth, M. (2010) Public sector management? But we’re 
academics, we don’t do that sort of thing! In G. Currie, J. Ford, N. 
Harding, & M. Learmonth (Eds.), Making public services management 
critical (pp. 55–67). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Jayasundara-Smits, S. (2010, September). Patronage in Sri Lanka. Paper 
presented at the Symposium: Promoting social inclusion in South Asia: 
Policies, pitfalls and analysis of welfare/insecurity regimes. Centre of 
Development Studies, University of Bath. 
Karra, N., & Phillips, N. (2008) Researching “back home”: International 
management research as autoethnography. Organizational Research 
Methods, 11(3), 541–561. 
Keenoy, T., & Seijo, G. (2010) Re-imagining e-mail: Academics in the castle. 
Organization. 17(2), 177–198. 
Krais, B. (1988) Der Begiff des Habitus bei Bourdieu und seine Bedeutung für 
die Bildungstheorie. [The concept of habitus in Bourdieu and its 
importance in the theory of education]. In B. Dewe, G. Frank, W. & Huge 
(Eds.), Der Begiff des Habitus bei Bourdieu und seine Bedeutung für die 
Bildungstheorie [The concept of habitus in Bourdieu and its importance in 
the theory of education]. , München: Hueber.  
Learmonth, M., & Humphreys, M. (2012) Autoethnography and academic 
identity: Glimpsing business school doppelgangers. Organization, 19, 99–
117. 
Madison, D. S. (2006) The dialogic performative in critical ethnography. Text 
and Performance Quarterly, 26(4), 320–324. 
 42 
Malsch, B., Gendron, Y., & Grazzini, F. (2011) Investigating interdisciplinary 
translations: The influence of Pierre Bourdieu on accounting literature. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 24(2), 194–228. 
Miller, P., & Napier, C. (1993) Genealogies of calculation, Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 18(7/8): 631–647.  
Neu, D. (2000) Accounting and accountability relations: Colonisation, genocide 
and Canada's first nations, Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 12(3), 268–288.  
Neu, D., Ocampo, E., Graham, C., & Heincke, M. (2006) Informing technologies 
and the World Bank. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31(7), 635–
662. 
Neu, D., & Taylor, A. (2000) Funding mechanisms, Cost drivers and the 
distribution of education funds in Alberta, Alberta Journal of Educational 
Research, 65(3), 214–232. 
Pelias, R. J. (2000) The critical life. Communication Education, 49(3), 220–228. 
Porter, T. D. (1992) Quantification and the accounting ideal in science. Social 
Studies in Science, 22, 633–652.  
Power, M. (1994) The audit explosion. London, UK: Demos.  
Preston, A., Chua, W. F., & Neu, D. (1997) The diagnosis-related group 
prospective payment system and the problem of government rationing 
health care to the elderly. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 22(2), 
147–164. 
Puxty, A. G. (1986) Social accounting as immanent legitimation: A critique of a 
technicist ideology. Advances in Public Interest Accounting, 1, 95–111. 
Silverman, D. (Ed.). (1997) Qualitative research: Theory, method and practice. 
London, UK: Sage. 
Stephenson, N., & Papadopoulos, D. (2006) Analysing everyday experience: 
Social research and political change. New York, NY: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 43 
Tinker, A. M., Lehman, C., & Neimark, M. (1991) Falling down the hole in the 
middle of the road: Political quietism in corporate social reporting. 
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 4(1), 28–54. 
Watson, T. J. (1995) Rhetoric, discourse and argument in organizational sense 
making: A reflexive tale. Organization Studies, 16(5), 805–821. 
Watson, T. J. (2008) Mighty McManus: Mystery myth and modernity. In M. 
Kostera (Ed.), Organizational olympians: Heroes and heroines of 
organizational myths (pp. 142–154). Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave 
MacMillan. 
Wolcott, H. F. (1994) Transforming qualitative data: Description, analysis, and 
interpretation: Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Yin, R. K. (2003) Case study research: Design and methods (3rd ed.). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Zhuang, J., Gunatilake, H., Nilmi, Y., Khan, M. E., Bracey, P., & Huang, B. 
(2009) Financial sector development, economic growth, and poverty 
reduction: A literature review. ADB Economics Working Paper Series, 
October (No. 173), pp. 1–32. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 44 
Appendix 1 
 
Primary data-collection techniques, timing; nature & amount of data 
collected from different participants 
                     TECHNIQUES 
 
ITEM 
Initial 
Telephone 
Interview 
(i) 
Descriptive type 
Questions  
(1) 
Series of Short Interviews (ii) 
E-mails Chats Phone 
When June 2006  July-August 2006 September 2006 
 
Amount of 
data: 
Approximate 
No. of 
Minutes/Wor
ds 
Case I 
 
 
Case II 
 
Cross-
checking; All 
cases 
 
N/A 
 
650 words 
 
13 
 
Once 
3 Calls 
45 minutes 
 
26 Minutes 
 
530 words 
 
12 
 
Twice 
4 calls  
45 minutes 
 
105 Minutes 
 
250 words 
 
41 
 
Nil 
 
30 calls 
62 minutes 
 
Nature of data 
 
Background 
information of 
the bank/credit 
applicant, nature 
of involvement of 
the participant 
Basic information on 
participants’ 
experience on credit 
decisions considered 
Friendly chat with a view to design the 
analytical-type questionnaire to obtain 
more explanations on the credit 
decisions and to obtain critical analytical 
data through cross-questioning 
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 Interview Guideline (1) 
 
1. Please identify and provide details; credit amount, project description and 
application process (you are free to use fictitious names) for a credit applicant 
where you are well aware of the credit application process followed. 
2. Was it successful? 
3. Did the credit applicant attempt to approach a higher authority to influence the 
loan officers who were undertaking the formal credit process? How (by what 
methods) did the credit applicant  approach the decision-makers? 
4. How, and to what extent, was the credit applicant accommodated by the 
decision-makers and what methods were followed? 
5. Please describe the the project proposal in detail in relation to the general 
economic environment in Sri Lanka? 
6. Please describe the loans negotiation processes in the form of dialogue, if you can 
recall them?  
7. What methods were used to present those projects to the decision-makers? 
8. What methods did the borrower use to convince the decision-makers? Please 
indicate why you believe the bank decision-makers accommodated the loan (if 
you feel comfortable answering this question). 
9. What were the immediate results of the credit decision? 
10. Please describe the present situation of the enterprise? Does it service the loan/s? 
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Interview Guideline (2); Analytical questions 
 
a) The approach and methods used by the borrower 
Why did the credit applicant approach the chairperson directly? 
• Was it because he was powerful? 
• Was it because he was rich? 
• Was it because he had the access to, or had, the network? 
• Had the applicant tried formal methods before? 
What was the outcome of such approaches? 
In the case of being denied credit, did the credit applicant attempt to approach the 
decision-makers informally? Was it successful? If not, why not? 
b) The approach and the methods used by the lender 
Why did the bank accommodate the credit applicant informally? 
• Was the project financially feasible? 
• Because of technical reasons such as excess liquidity? 
• Because the decision-maker was deceptively guided by the capable credit 
applicant? 
• Was it for personal gratification? 
• Was it on sympathetic/patriotic/nationalistic grounds and/or based on social 
responsibility? 
• Was it because of a personal relationship? 
• Was the decision influenced by the ego of the decision-maker? 
• Did the organisational structure force the decision-maker to make such 
decisions? 
• Have the SME government financing schemes had any impact on this 
decision? 
c) The influencing factors 
Please comment on the following factors as contributing or acting as roadblocks 
towards the decision-making process for this decision: 
• Organisation structure 
• Poor management skills of the relevant bank officers 
• Nationalistic or patriotic attitudes 
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• Egoistic motives 
• Government policies on entrepreneurship development 
• Government policies in SME financing 
 
d) The decision-making process 
Please critically analyze the decision-making process and comment on the following 
questions: 
• Was it quick? 
• Was it after following proper banking policies and procedures? 
• Was it based on cash flows and proper credit evaluations? 
• Were decision-makers rewarded as a result of those decisions? 
 
e) Concluding remarks 
Please feel free to express your views on this credit application with regard to the 
social networks and economic and social power of individuals involved. 
Also, can you express your views on the impact of such credit decisions on 
economic development and addressing poverty problems in Sri Lanka? 
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Appendix 2 
 
Summary of the analysis of case studies data 
 Case study I: Tony Case study II: Silva 
 
Project 
 
 
Large-scale credit for a 
garment manufacturing 
company struggling with lack 
of orders and liquidity 
problems. 
 
Small-scale credit, an up-and-coming 
janitorial-service enterprise 
struggling with loss of business and 
with liquidity problems. 
Approach 
 
 
Casual, informal and personal. 
Both the credit decision-
maker and the client are 
socially powerful 
businesspersons. 
First, formal and accommodated. 
Then, informal and accommodated. 
Then, formal and rejected.  
Issues Client was under threat of 
foreclosure and redundancy. 
Threat of redundancy of 
25,000 workers. 
 
A big competitor penetrating into 
the business.  
Soured relationship between bank 
officers and the client.  
Socially, applicant is less influential. 
Negotiation 
 
Friendly. Quick. Treated differently by different 
decision-makers, only one of whom 
was genuinely sympathetic. 
Decision Without formal evaluation. 
Granted over the table. 
First, formal and granted, then 
informal and granted, and finally, 
formal and declined. 
Explanation or 
Justification 
 
Sympathetic and patriotic 
grounds. 
Business development drive.  
First, personal benefits, error 
rectifying and reciprocate. Then rigid 
application of rules. 
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Highlights 
 
• The paper uses the tools of Bourdieu and his distinction between the dominant and the 
dominated (symbolic violence) and how that influences habitus (and therefore practice) to 
understand the accounting and discrimination issues. 
 
• While the accounting and discrimination literature tends to focus on how accounting 
serves for the class struggles and slavery, race and gender discrimination, the case studies 
through the auto-ethnography of bank practices presented in this paper attempt to 
understand the accounting and discrimination issues in the field of bank lending. 
 
• Findings of the paper demonstrate how individuals with given habitus behave and follow 
given strategies to deploy rational accounting systems at micro level and create the 
outcome of creating and reinforcing discrimination.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
